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Introduction
Insider information might preclude trade (see, e.g., Akerlof, 1970) and reduce welfare. For example, in the context of mergers and acquisitions asymmetric information may prevent desirable takeovers. One institutional measure to allow desirable trade and transactions is the compulsory disclosure of private information, i.e., a legal obligation on the informed party to reveal its superior information.
The European Union lately issued two central directives related to the acquisition of firms: the Transparency Directive 1 and the Takeover-Bid Directive 2 . The main intention of the Transparency Directive is to improve investor protection and market confidence. It tries to simplify access to corporate information across EU member states, discourage secret stock building in listed companies, and reduce legal uncertainty. 3 The goal of the Transparency Directive is therefore to mitigate the problem of asymmetric information for buyers/investors.
The Takeover-Bid Directive improves the information rights of shareholders who may be affected by their share prices, both when opting out before a take-over and when maintaining their status. It requires that "a decision to make a [takeover] bid is made public without delay" 4 . Furthermore "an offerer is required to draw up and make public in good time an offer document containing the information necessary to enable the holders of the offeree company's securities to reach a properly informed decision on the bid." 5 Hence, potential investors intending to acquire a firm have to publicly place their takeover bid and disclose further information in the offer document.
Implementing these two directives suggests that compulsory disclosure is seen as an effective policy measure to reduce asymmetric information and enable desirable takeovers. Yet it is difficult to assess the effectiveness of compulsory disclosure in serving this task due to the lack of available data. Therefore an experimental approach appears like an adequate first step to analyze this issue empirically. 6 We theoretically and experimentally explore the effects of compulsory disclosure of information on the decisions of a seller and a buyer engaged in bilateral trade. 7 Extending the scenario discussed by Samuelson and Bazerman (1985) , we distinguish two settings with asymmetric information, namely
• one with only the seller and
• one with only the buyer knowing the value of the firm. Since we are interested in the effects of compulsory information disclosure, we analyze the transition effect from each of the two asymmetric information cases to the setting where both parties are informed about the firm's value. Previous experimental studies focus on specific information constellations of the "acquiring-a-company"game (either only the seller is informed, Ball et al., 1991 , Selten et al., 2005 , Foreman and Murnighan, 1996 , Dittrich et al., 2012 , Grosskopf et al., 2007 or only the buyer is informed, Chlass, 2013) and not on the transition from asymmetric to complete information, i.e., we experimentally investigate the effects of compulsory disclosure in this context. The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the possible institutional settings together with their game theoretic benchmark solutions and welfare implications. The hypotheses to be tested experimentally are stated in Section 3. Section 4 describes the experimental design. Experimental results are illustrated and statistically analyzed in Section 5. Section 6 concludes.
The "acquiring-a-company" game
This game involves a (potential) seller S and a (potential) buyer B. The seller owns a company he evaluates by qv, where q ∈ (0, 1) is an exogenously given and commonly known parameter and v ∈ (0, 1) is the value of his company for the buyer to whom he wants to sell it. Thus evaluations of the firm are perfectly and linearly correlated, and due to q < 1 trade is welfare enhancing. If p denotes the price for selling the company to B, the gains from trade are v − p for B and p − qv for S such 7 It should already be noted here that in our theoretical and experimental analysis we maintain the unitary actor assumption of one individual potential buyer and one individual potential seller.
Thus we cannot comment on cases where some shareholders opt out and others maintain their status and on how this depends on information conditions. Our contribution thus does not explore the efficacy of the EU Directives, but only the effect of compulsory disclosure on the decisions of one seller and one buyer engaged in bilateral trade. that the surplus amounts to (1 − q)v. We assume throughout that v is randomly distributed according to the uniform density on the support [0, 1] and that there is common (knowledge of) risk neutrality. As Samuelson and Bazerman (1985) we assume that (i) buyer B proposes a price p ∈ [0, q] which (ii) seller S can accept (δ(p) = 1) or reject (δ(p) = 0), the latter resulting in zero payoffs for both parties. Altogether the payoff is δ (p) (v − p) for B, and
Theoretically one can distinguish four different information structures. There is no information at all about the realization of v in the baseline Scenario (NN): Neither buyer nor seller know the realization of v.
Since v is uniformly distributed on the unit interval, the seller's expected payoff in case of δ(p) = 1 is Eπ S (p) = p − q/2 so that S would accept (δ * (p) = 1) only if p ≥ q/2. Since the buyer expects Eπ B (p) = 1/2 − p from trade, the optimal price offer of B is p N N = q/2. S will accept this offer, leading to trade. The expected payoffs for buyer and seller are (1)
Buyer B exploits ultimatum power and acquires the total expected surplus (1 − q)/2 from trade.
The information structure analyzed by Samuelson and Bazerman (1985) is
Scenario NI: Seller S is perfectly informed about v, whereas it is commonly known that buyer B expects v to be generated according to the uniform density on [0, 1].
Clearly, δ * (p) = 1 is optimal only if p/q ≥ v > 0. The buyer's expected payoff thus depends on the chosen price p
In case of q ≤ 1/2, the optimal price offer by the buyer is p N I = q. The expected payoffs for the buyer and the seller are
i.e., there is welfare-enhancing trade as in Scenario NN, but with more balanced gains from trade.
In case of q > 1/2, however, Eπ B < 0 for p > 0 so that the optimal price offer of B is p N I = 0. Similar to the "lemon problem" (Akerlof, 1970) , there is no trade due to adverse selection and the (expected) payoffs are
In the third Scenario IN only the buyer is aware of v while it is commonly known that the seller expects v to be generated according to the uniform density on [0, 1].
The seller obviously expects the price to be below the value, i.e., v > p. Therefore the expected payoff for the seller is
Due to q < 1, this payoff function is concave in p and positive in the interval p ∈ ( q 2−q , 1), rendering p IN = q 2−q the buyer's optimal price offer. The expected payoffs for buyer and seller are
The expected payoff for B is lower than in scenario NN for all q > 0, due to trade being restricted to v ≥ p IN = q/(2 − q) > 0. This solution is partly v-revealing: in case of a 0-offer the seller concludes that v < p IN , whereas from observing p = p IN he infers that v ≥ p IN , i.e., whether trade occurs depends on v.
In the fourth Scenario II both, buyer and seller, know v.
The buyer exploits ultimatum power by offering p II = qv yielding the expected payoffs
coinciding with those in scenario NN. The same expected payoffs, however, rely on a crucial difference in that seller S earns nothing for all v ∈ (0, 1) in scenario II, whereas in scenario N N his payoff q(1/2 − v) is v-dependent and specifically negative for v > 1/2.
The results of all scenarios are summarized in Table 1 : the seller is ex ante best off when privately informed about v, i.e., with exclusive information. Otherwise, his expected payoff is zero. The buyer is best off when both players are either informed or uninformed about v.
Seller is informed about v no yes The experimental data contains only ex-post realized payoffs which sum up to v(1 − q) if a matched pair of a buyer and seller agreed on trade. To use something more dependent on the decisions of participants we focus on two measures: (i) the sum of negative payoffs and (ii) the frequency of trade. The latter's explanatory power regarding welfare is straightforward: in NI as well as in IN asymmetric information restricts trade to cases where parameter values of q and v satisfy the critical thresholds identified in the theoretical analysis. 9 Clearly, more information on either side should lead to more trade. As an increasing level of q hampers trade, this parameter is crucial for how many acquisitions are realized. Due to this critical role of q we will investigate the decisions made for alternative levels of q separately.
The first measure, the sum of negative payoffs, reflects erroneous decisions, i.e., either buyer participants propose too high prices or seller participants accept too low prices. Complete information renders the game less complex and should therefore reduce negative payoffs. According to these measures the benchmark predicts that compulsory information disclosure will increase trade and decrease negative payoffs.
Hypothesis 1. Eliminating asymmetric information should enhance the frequency of trade and reduce negative payoffs.
Eliminating asymmetric information further affects the payoffs of buyer and seller: while the buyer's payoff increases for all levels of q, the seller's payoff decreases for low levels, q ≤ 1/2. This leads to
Hypothesis 2a. Eliminating asymmetric information for the potential buyer should increase the payoff of the buyer but decrease the payoff of the seller for low levels q ≤ 1/2 only.
When also becoming informed about v the seller does not gain, whereas the buyer's payoff increases. This gives us
Hypothesis 2b. Eliminating asymmetric information for the potential seller increases the payoff of the buyer, while the payoff of the seller is left unchanged.
Altogether, we expect compulsory disclosure to increase welfare, with buyers gaining and sellers possibly losing.
Experimental design and setup
The All sessions started with a set of control questions clarifying and testing whether the decision tasks and the calculation of payoffs were fully understood by the participants. To emphasize that negative payoffs were possible, an appropriate example was included in the control questions. After all participants had answered all control questions correctly, three trial rounds took place to ensure that participants understood the consequences of own and others' decisions.
After completion of phases 1 and 2 of the experiment, participants were asked to fill out a postexperimental questionnaire designed to collect demographic information and elicit participants' risk tolerance (see Holt and Laury, 2002) .
In the experiment, payoffs were calculated in Experimental Currency Units (ECU) and converted into euros at a given exchange rate (6 ECU = 1 euro) at the end of the experiment. Besides a show-up fee of 5 euros, participants received their payoff earned by 6 randomly drawn decisions (one for each of the six rounds) as well as the reward for the lottery question in the postexperimental questionnaire assessing risk tolerance. The experiment was programmed in z-tree (see Fischbacher, 2007) . We ran 3 sessions with 32 participants each for each treatment. Participants were students of Friedrich Schiller University Jena (Germany). On average, one session lasted about 90 minutes. The average payment of participants amounted to 16.36 euros including the show-up fee and the reward for the lottery question.
Earnings ranged from 5.10 to 47.30 euros.
When payoffs (not including the show-up fee and the reward for the lottery question) summed up to a negative value, participants could either pay their debt out of pocket or work it off by completing an effort task (i.e., counting the letter "t" in a text). 10 All 8 (8.3%) participants confronted with negative payoffs chose to work off their debt.
Experimental results

Descriptives
We start with descriptive results concerning phase 1 in both treatments, i.e., either only the seller is informed about the value of the firm (phase 1 in treatment (NI → II)) or only the buyer is informed (phase 1 in treatment (IN → II)).
In phase 1 Note that in the cases where the same v-value was randomly drawn twice so that two mean values of SP (BP ) exist for one value of v, the mean of the two is depicted in Figure 1a (1b In both treatments (minimum) prices of the informed party increase in v and q.
For an interpretation of this result, recall that the payoff for a seller is (BP − qv),
i.e., decreasing in q and v. Given that payoffs become negative when BP < qv, informed seller participants apparently understood the interplay of own payoff with parameters q and v: to avoid negative payoffs, they chose a higher price acceptance level SP for higher values of q and v. In treatment (IN → II) informed buyers anticipated this so that their mean offers display the same dependency on parameters v and q, see Figure 1b .
Note that trade did not take place in all depicted cases, but only if BP ≥ SP . This is the case to the left of the intersection points of the respective BP and SP curves in Figure 1a and to the right of the intersection points of the curves depicting the means of BP and SP in Figure 1b (Figure 2a ). As for the sake of clarity the corresponding decisions of buyers and sellers are omitted in Figures 2a and 2b , it is difficult to conclude from these descriptive results whether or not compulsory information disclosure reduces negative payoffs.
Erroneous decisions and the frequency of trade
Hypothesis 1 postulates that compulsory information disclosure reduces the sum of negative payoffs and increases the frequency of trade. For treatment (NI → II),
where the seller gains information from compulsory disclosure, the changes in the sum of negative payoffs are depicted in The total number of cases with negative payoffs reveals that more information does not necessarily decrease the number of erroneous decisions but renders these decisions less fatal in that the resulting negative payoffs are closer to zero. 12 Thus, more information leads to better decisions resulting in less negative payoffs.
As a clear indicator of welfare we refer to the frequency of trade which we calculate for every possible level of q separately. As q varied per round, we identify the number of decisions potentially leading to trade in one round: given 15 decisions per participant we have -in a session consisting of 32 participants -480 decisions per round. For the three sessions of every treatment this provides 1,440 possible acquisitions for every level of q. As trade takes place whenever BP > SP , increasing buyer and/or decreasing seller prices enhance trade. Table 4 displays the significant changes of (minimum) prices when moving from phase 1 with asymmetric information to phase 2 with symmetric information (Mann-Whitney tests, highest p-value≤ 0.04). Prices can increase, column"+", or decrease, column "−"; insignificant comparisons are listed in column "n.s.". For every level of q we compare the 15 decisions of the informed sellers in phase 1 with their 15 decisions in phase 2 and the one decision of the uniformed buyers in phase 1 with their 15 decisions in phase 2. Take for example buyer prices for q = 0.35: 20% of the comparisons result in buyer prices significantly increasing from phase 1 to phase 2 whereas in 73.3% of the comparisons of BP in phase 1 with BP in phase 2 buyer prices significantly decrease with more information.
Theoretically buyer prices should decrease with more information while seller acceptance levels should remain unchanged. 13 However, the comparisons above indicate that both, buyer and seller prices, decrease due to compulsory information disclosure: becoming informed about the true value of the firm buyers offer less, while sellers choose lower acceptance levels when also buyers become informed.
While the latter effect enhances trade, decreasing buyer prices work in the opposite direction, hampering trade. This interplay of two opposing effects could be responsible for the insignificant results of compulsory information disclosure on the frequency of trade.
For Hypothesis 1 we thus conclude Result 1a. In treatment (NI → II) compulsory disclosure decreases the sum of negative payoffs for all levels of q. While the frequency of trade does not significantly change, buyer and seller prices significantly decrease with more information.
Analyzing Hypothesis 1 using treatment (IN → II) , where the seller gains information through compulsory disclosure, we again investigate the sum of negative payoffs. As before (Table 4 ) analyzing the significant changes of (minimum) prices when moving from phase 1 to phase 2 leads to the frequencies presented in Half of the comparisons regarding buyer prices reveal a significant increase whereas the other half shows a significant decrease. Apparently buyers were confronted with two opposing incentives which can be identified by the theoretical analysis: (i) for low v-values buyer prices and seller acceptance levels are predicted to decrease with more information, whereas (ii) for high v-values both are predicted to increase with compulsory information disclosure. 14 Investigating the proposed effects empirically makes it necessary to look at the data for v ≥ 50 and v < 50 separately. The proposed effects find strong empirical support: (i) for low v-values we have clear evidence that buyer prices and seller acceptance levels mostly decrease significantly, (ii) for high v-values BP and SP both significantly increase due to compulsory information disclosure. Overall the results presented in Table 7 suggest that the negative effect of compulsory disclosure is strongest for sellers' minimum prices, while for buyer prices two counter effects compensate each other. The probability of trade is thus enhanced rather than hampered by more information. This gives us Result 1b. In treatment (IN → II) compulsory disclosure significantly increases the frequency of trade what can be explained by the increase (decrease) of buyer prices and seller acceptance levels for high (low) values of the firm.
Payoffs of buyers and sellers
Let us now turn to the payoffs of buyers and sellers (Hypotheses 2a and 2b). Our analysis suggests that in treatment (NI → II) the seller suffers from information disclosure for low levels of parameter q, q ≤ 1/2, whereas the formerly uninformed buyer gains for all q-levels (Hypothesis 2a). Empirically, in phase 2 buyers' payoffs are significantly higher than in phase 1 for all q-levels (p-value≤ 0.01 Overall, compulsory disclosure profits the party becoming informed, while it might be harmful for the party which loses its information advantage.
Conclusion
We theoretically and experimentally investigate the welfare and payoff implications of institutional changes trying to reduce the negative effects associated with insider information, suggested for example by the EU Takeover-Bid Directive and the EU Transparency Directive. By beginning with market scenarios characterized by asymmetric information and switching to scenarios where this private information becomes commonly known, we enrich the analysis by Samuelson and Bazerman (1985) and subsequent studies. Although a better informed seller represents the more natural setting of private information, the profitability of a firm may also depend on external events about which the potential buyer could be better informed.
For example, a potential buyer may have learned that a major customer, e.g., a public authority or a large commercial customer, has decided to increase its demand for the firm's deliveries before the seller himself learns about this.
We identify two positive effects of compulsory information disclosure. On the one hand it crowds out erroneous decisions resulting in negative payoffs, especially when non-informed buyers become informed. On the other hand it increases welfare by enhancing trade, with this effect being most prominent when sellers become informed. In both settings compulsory disclosure significantly increases the payoff of the less informed party. Only in case of an initially uninformed buyer the payoff of the better informed party, the seller, decreases significantly when providing complete information.
Overall, our theoretical and experimental results support policy measures aiming at compulsory information disclosure, as more information enforces accurate decisions and enhances trade.
Hence, you will receive the participation fee and payment for the questionnaire part in any case.
Detailed description of the experiment
The experiment consists of two phases, each consisting of three rounds.
The procedure of a round in phase 1 is structured as follows:
earnings of S and B are 0.
If the buying price BP offered by B is higher than or equal to the minimum selling price SP, seller S accepts the bid made by buyer B, and the following earnings result from these choices:
The buyer receives the random value v minus the offered buying price BP.
The seller receives the buying price BP proposed by B minus a share in the amount of x% of the random value v.
The amount of x% varies in the three rounds of a phase and can either correspond to 35%, 45%, or 55%, while the sequence of these three x-values is determined randomly.
Therefore, the earnings in the event of a trade can be summarized as follows:
where x% may correspond to either 35%, 45%, or 55%.
Please note that profits from the sale are only positive for both participantsbuyer B and seller S -if the randomly selected value v is higher than the buying price BP and this, in turn, is higher than x% v (v > BP > x%v).
If v is less than BP, buyer B receives a negative payoff due to the purchase. If BP is less than x% v, seller S receives a negative payoff due to the sale.
Therefore, seller S owns a good that has value v for buyer B but is less valuable for the latter, namely x% of value v. Depending on the buying price BP, on x% and on the value v, it can be advantageous for S to sell to B.
You will receive the instructions for phase 2 at the end of phase 1.
Before phase 1 of the experiment begins, we will ask you to answer a few control questions to help you better understand the rules of the experiment. This will be followed by practice rounds, to become familiar with the structure of the experiment. If you have any questions, please raise your hand.
Instructions for phase 2
In each of the three rounds of phase 2, both participants ( 
